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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the cyclical behaviour of household labour income
risk in Great Britain and the role of social insurance policy in mitigating against this source
of income risk. To achieve this, we decompose stochastic idiosyncratic household income into
its transitory and persistent components. We focus our analysis of income risk captured by
the second to fourth moments of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent com-
ponent of income. We find that household labour income risk increases during contractions
via changes in third and fourth central moments of persistent shocks to labour income, while
the variance remains acyclical. We also find that economic policy has reduced the level of
risk exposure and its increase during contractions via benefits rather than tax policies.
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1 Introduction
The cyclical behaviour of labour income risk and the extent to which risk exposure increases
during periods of contraction have significant implications for household welfare and economic
policy. The effects of adverse idiosyncratic labour income shocks on households’consumption
fluctuations are typically stronger for persistent relative to purely transitory shocks.1 There-
fore, knowing whether periods of contraction imply an increased probability of receiving large
persistent negative labour income shocks is important when examining the cyclicality of labour
income risk. The absence of market opportunities for complete insurance against negative shocks
to labour income motivates public intervention. This intervention involves providing insurance
typically via the redistributive mechanisms embedded in the tax system and the insurance ele-
ment of benefits policies. Thus, understanding the cyclical properties of labour income risk and
which policies successfully mitigate the increase in risk exposure during contractions is critical
for policymaking.
These considerations have motivated empirical research which examines whether the mo-
ments of the distribution of shocks to labour income higher than the first depend on the aggre-
gate state of the economy. Given the importance of persistent labour income shocks, a small
number of studies have directly examined the cyclical properties of the shocks to the persis-
tent component of the individual or household income. In a seminal analysis, Storesletten et
al. (2004) estimated a model for income dynamics with a state-dependent variance, using US
survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and found that the variance
of the persistent component of household labour income is countercyclical. The advantage of
their methodology is that it identifies the contrast between booms and slumps by exploiting
the history dependence of cross-sectional moments, which incorporate cyclical variation at the
aggregate level during and before the panel data sample period. In an influential contribution,
Guvenen et al. (2014), study the distribution of individual males earnings growth using US So-
cial Security Administration data. They discover that its left-skewness is countercyclical, while
its variance is acyclical. These imply an increased probability of negative shocks to labour in-
come during contractions. Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020), using data for Germany and the US,
extend the approach in Storesletten et al. (2004) and estimate models for income dynamics that
allow for regime-switching second, third and fourth central moments. They confirm that the
moments of shocks to the persistent component of household labour income higher than the first
are cyclical, implying an increase in risk during contractions. They also find that government
intervention, in the form of taxation and social insurance/benefits policies reduces the increase
in risk exposure arising from shocks to permanent labour income in contractions. However, they
do not examine the effect of the tax and benefit element separately.
We provide new evidence on the cyclical behaviour of household labour income risk in Great
Britain (GB) and assess the roles of tax and benefit policy in mitigating against this source of
risk. We achieve this using panel data for 1991-2008 from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) and aggregate time series of the economic cycle since 1956.2 To capture fluctuations
1See, e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) for a review of research on earnings dynamics.
2The longer time series for the aggregate state is used because the moments of the persistent component of
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in the aggregate state so that we can study its implications for idiosyncratic risk, we classify
years as expansions or contractions, based on the offi cial classification of years as recessions
following the Bank of England definition. This requires two consecutive quarters of contraction
in GDP. The BHPS dataset, which has been used extensively for income dynamics analysis in
the UK, provides measures of annual earnings at the individual and household levels, in addition
to observable characteristics.3 We examine the effect of economic policy using different measures
of pre-and post-policy household income.
We apply a model of income dynamics that decomposes stochastic idiosyncratic household
income into components that capture initial (cohort-specific) conditions as well as transitory
and persistent shocks. We let the second through fourth central moments of the probability
distributions of these shocks depend on calendar time. In particular, following the parametric
approach of Storesletten et al. (2004) and Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020), we allow the moments
of transitory and persistent shock distributions to vary between expansions and contractions of
the aggregate economy. Motivated by empirical evidence for GB, we also allow the moments of
the cohort-specific distributions to be time-varying to capture underlying cohort-level hetero-
geneity that may relate to pre-labour market conditions, separately from cyclical fluctuations.
Our model is estimated employing a minimum-distance estimation procedure.
Our first set of findings relates to the cyclicality of risk in household labour income. We
find that risk increases during contractions in GB and that this is due to changes in the third
and fourth central moments of the distribution of shocks to the persistent component of labour
income. The more robust effect comes from the third central moment, which becomes more
negative during contractions. In contrast, we do not find evidence of cyclicality for the variance.4
Note that a negative third central moment signifies that the left tail is thicker than the right
tail. A thicker left tail in contractions than in expansions implies a higher probability of a
household receiving a large negative persistent income shock in bad times. Moreover, an increase
in the fourth central moment during contractions of the aggregate state works to increase the
probability of receiving extreme shocks, implying an even thicker left tail. Our results are
broadly consistent with the findings reported in Guvenen et al. (2014) and Busch and Ludwig
(2020) for the US, Busch and Ludwig (2016) for Germany and Busch et al. (2021) for Germany,
Sweden, France and the US.
Our second set of results relates to evaluating the risk mitigation effects of taxation separately
from benefits. We find that social insurance works in this respect via benefits. These significantly
reduce both the level of risk exposure and its increase during contractions, when focusing on
persistent shocks to household labour income. In contrast, taxes do not have a significant
effect. The separate evaluation of taxes and benefits to reduce the cyclicality of the persistent
component of labour income risk is novel in this literature. Looking at earnings growth as a proxy
the idiosyncratic shocks incorporate past cyclical variation since 1956. This period corresponds to the year that
60-year-old individuals in 1991 entered the labour market at age 25.
3Household characteristics allow us to partial out observable deterministic components (i.e. experience, edu-
cation, region of residence and household size effects) to isolate idiosyncratic labour income in the data.
4For GB, Bayer and Juessen (2012) follow the approach in Storesletten et al. (2004) and find that the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks to wages is acyclical using the BHPS dataset. Moreover, Cappellari and Jenkins (2014),
using BHPS data, find that the variance of individual earnings growth shows little time variation.
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for earnings risk, Busch et al. (2021) find that both taxes and benefits reduce the cyclicality in
risk exposure associated with changes in the skewness of the distribution of earnings growth.5
We organise the rest of the paper as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview
of the data and relevant properties that motivate the model specification. In Section 3, we
introduce the theoretical model of income risk dynamics that we estimate. The results are in
Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 contains the conclusions.
2 Data and empirical motivation
We next provide information on the BHPS dataset and variables used for the estimation and
analysis of the empirical properties of inequality that underlie our model specification and iden-
tification in Section 3.
2.1 Data
The BHPS is a comprehensive longitudinal survey for GB, covering 1991 to 2008.6 This dataset
includes information for up to 5000 households on earnings and other sources of income for indi-
viduals and households over an annual period starting in September and on the socio-economic
characteristics of the respondents. These characteristics include gender, education, age, social
(professional) class and region.7 BHPS was replaced in 2010 by a new panel data survey, Un-
derstanding Society, which does not include information on annual earnings, and thus cannot
be used to analyse annual earnings risk. We also use the auxiliary dataset Derived Current and
Annual Net Household Income Variables (DCANHIV), compiled by Bardasi et al. (2012), which
contains derived data on household disposable income. Note that the DCANHIV dataset tracks
the same individuals/households for the same period as the BHPS, i.e. 1991-2008.
We retain all households where the head is between 23-62 years for our analysis. The house-
hold heads must have non-imputed individual earnings and report individual earnings higher
than half the product of the minimum legal hourly wage and 520 hours.8 We further restrict
the sample by keeping the households who are present for at least three consecutive periods.
The DCANHIV dataset provides consistent series for household labour income, private trans-
fers, taxes and national insurance contributions and benefits. Labour income is the sum of
annual earnings of the household members plus annual private transfers income. Taxes refer to
annual household income taxes after credits, while benefits are the annual social benefits income,
which totals all receipts from state benefits from all household’s members (including national
insurance retirement pensions). We present in our analysis below results for labour income,
5Evidence from e.g. Blundell and Etheridge (2010) and Belfield et al. (2017) demonstrates that in the UK
benefits have stronger effects than taxes in mitigating household income inequality. Here we focus on the effects
of social insurance on risk reduction.
6Further information on the datasets, definitions and construction of variables and details on sample selection,
can be found in Appendix A.
7Data on Northern Ireland are available from 1997 via the additional BHPS sub-sample European Community
Household Panel Survey. However, we focus on GB to not further restrict the time dimension, which is important
for our analysis.
8We follow Blundell and Etheridge (2010) for the definition of the head. The head is usually the male in a
household consisting of a married couple with children or the oldest working male. See Appendix A.2 for details.
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labour income minus taxes and national insurance contributions, labour income plus benefits,
and labour income net of taxes and national insurance contributions plus benefits.
2.1.1 Aggregate state
Given that the BHPS annual cycle begins in September, a year t in our analysis refers to the
date September t− 1 to August t. We classify the years between 1956 and 2008 into recessions
and expansions depending on whether they include an offi cial recession. We define recessions
following the Bank of England practice, which requires two consecutive quarters of contraction
in GDP. Following this, a year t in our analysis is a year of recession when t = 1956, 1961, 1962,
1973, 1974, 1975, 1980, 1981, 1990, 1991, 2008.
2.2 Inequality over cohorts
We next examine the cohort and age-specific properties of the cross-sectional distribution of
residual household labour income, net of variation due to observable characteristics. The il-
lustration in Figure 1 reveals empirical properties used to motivate our model specification.
Following Deaton and Paxson (1994) (see also Storesletten et al. (2004), Heathcote et al. (2005)
and Blundell et al. (2015)), we use a dummy variable regression decomposition of the cross-
sectional higher central moments of the idiosyncratic component of household labour income, to
estimate cohort and age effects. The estimated idiosyncratic component, denoted as υ̂i,h,t, for
household i of age group h at time t, is obtained as the residual of a Mincerian type regression
that partials out observable variation in household labour income.9 Then, for every year t, we
group households into 5-year adjacent age cells indexed by h, i.e. we define a household as
belonging to the age group h if the age of the head was between h− 2 and h+ 2. We obtain the
cross-sectional central moments mυτ (h, t, g), for τ = 2, 3, 4, as:









where g = t− (h + 24− 1) denotes the cohort, υ̂i,h,t denotes the sample averages of υ̂i,h,t, Nh,t
is the number of households i of age group h at time t.10 We then regress mυτ (h, t, g)’s on a full
set of age and cohort dummies, i.e.




g,τDg + νh,t,g,τ , τ = 2, 3, 4, (2)
where νh,t,g,τ is an error term.11 Figure 1 presents different plots using the estimated βg,τ , cap-
turing cohort-related effects on the distribution of residual household labour income in relation
to initial conditions (birth year) and experience of recessions, partialling out age effects.
9The Mincerian regression will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
10This implies a total of 3 × T ×H = 1, 944 moments mυk(h, t, g), since our sample length and age groupings
are T = 18 and H = 36 respectively.
11Note that we cannot control for cohort, age and time effects simultaneously due to perfect collinearity.
4
Figure 1: Cohort effects on the distribution of residual household labour income






























Note: Figure 1 plots the coeffi cients of cohort-specific dummies in a regression of central moments of
the cross-sectional distributions of residual household labour income on cohort and age dummies, for
different year of birth (1st row) and different shares of recession years since the age of 25 (2ndrow).
The first row of Figure 1 depicts the cohort effects (i.e. the estimated cohort coeffi cients)
over the period that defines the cohort (i.e. year of birth). These plots show a downward trend
in cohort second and fourth central moments for newer cohorts and an upward trend in the
third central moment. These trends imply that the cohort effects are drawn from distributions
that tend to become more symmetric over time and with less extreme values, further suggesting
that controlling for life-cycle effects, younger generations are more similar in terms of household
labour income variation. This observation may reflect fewer or milder aggregate macroeconomic
shocks for younger generations. However, it may also capture more similarity in labour market
skills at the point of entry into the labour market, which may arise from social changes and
government intervention (e.g. public education and health). These observations help to motivate
our modelling of effects associated with initial conditions that remain over the work-life. In
particular, we will partial out the influence of potential pre-labour market changes on labour
income risk to focus on the importance of shocks during work-life.
The second row, where we plot the cohort coeffi cient estimates against the proportion of
contractions that each cohort has experienced, is motivated by Figure 1b in Storesletten et al.
(2004). Using PSID data in the US, Storesletten et al. (2004) find that cohort variance is
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increasing in the share of recessions that the cohort has experienced. This finding motivates
their interest in estimating the aggregate-state dependency of the variance by exploiting between-
cohort variation in their experience of recessions. Row 2 in Figure 1 suggests that for GB the
variance seems unrelated to the share of recessions. In contrast, there is some evidence of
a negative relationship between the third central moment and the share of recessions and a
positive relationship with the fourth central moment. As pointed out above, since the estimated
cohort coeffi cients do not control for time, the relationships shown in row 2 may be affected
by generation-specific pre-labour market factors. Thus, it is important in our model of the
idiosyncratic component of income developed in the next Section to allow for generation-specific
initial conditions in addition to dependence on the aggregate state.
3 Income risk model
Our econometric analysis is motivated by the framework and identification strategy introduced
by Storesletten et al. (2004) and extended by Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020) to study persistent
shocks that vary with the aggregate state. This analysis builds on a large literature of income
dynamics (see Topel and Ward (1992), Gottschalk and Moffi tt (1994), Haider (2001), Baker
and Solon (2003), Kalwij and Alessie (2007), Blundell et al. (2015) and Meghir and Pistaferri
(2011) for a review). The basic object of analysis for the various measures of income and risk is
households whose head is aged between 25 to 60 in the period 1991-2008.
3.1 Model specification
We assume that the process determining the natural logarithm of annual household income,
yi,h,t, is comprised of an observable deterministic part, q (xi,h,t), and an unobservable random
component, υi,h,t:
yi,h,t = q (xi,h,t) + υi,h,t, (3)
for household i whose head has age h = 1, ...,H = 36 in period t = 1991, ..., 2008.12 The
idiosyncratic component of income, υi,h,t, is driven by: (i) stochastic effects that are received
once at birth, remain fixed over the lifetime and that depend on the cohort, χi,g, where g =
t−(h+24−1) ∈ [1932, 1933, ..., 1984] denotes year of birth (i.e. the cohort effect); (ii) persistent
shocks, zi,h,t, and (iii) transitory shocks, εi,t. In particular, υi,h,t and zi,h,t are given by:
υi,h,t = χi,g + zi,h,t + εi,t, (4)
zi,h,t = ρzi,h−1,t−1 + ηi,t, (5)
where 0 < ρ < 1 and ηi,t captures innovations to the persistent effects. The distributional








































where Fχ, Fε, and Fη denote the density functions of χi,g, εi,t and ηi,t respectively. The four
arguments in each of these functions refer to the first through the fourth central moment.
Moreover, γg = g − 1931 ∈ [1, 2, ..., 53] is a cohort-defined trend tracking the birth years of the
households whose head was aged between 25 to 60 in 1991-2008.
The distributions of the innovations to the transitory and persistent shocks are allowed to be
time dependent. In particular, we let the respective moments higher than the first take values
depending on whether the aggregate state, f(t), refers to an expansion, e, or a contraction, c.
We define two indicator variables: (i) If(t)=e, equal to 1 if period t is an expansion (and zero
otherwise); and (ii) If(t)=c, equal to 1 if period t is a contraction (and zero otherwise). This
implies that for k = ε, η and τ = 2, 3, 4:
mk,f(t)τ ≡ mk,eτ If(t)=e +mk,cτ If(t)=c. (9)
The model specification implies that the history of persistent shocks after entering the labour
market at the age h = 1 is important for idiosyncratic income. We assume that zi,0,t = 0,
implying that before joining the labour market there are no persistent shocks that matter for
income dynamics after h = 1 other than those captured by the initial conditions χi,g. In turn,
these remain fixed over the work-life and thus do not have a time subscript. In other words,
the initial conditions represent stochastic factors that are relevant for income dynamics before
joining the labour market. Motivated by empirical observations in Figure 1, we have allowed
for the possibility that the effects χi,g differ across generations. Given that our interest is in
estimating potential dependence of mk,f(t)τ , k = ε, η and τ = 2, 3, 4, on contractions, we let
the initial conditions vary over cohorts to not confound the time-dependence of working life
idiosyncratic shocks with underlying time variation of pre-work heterogeneity.
The model specification here is a generalisation of those in Storesletten et al. (2004) and















4), the model is the same with that in Busch and Ludwig (2020). If we further
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return to the base specification in Storesletten et al. (2004).13
The set of theoretical moments for υi,h,t are a function of past moments of innovations
to the persistent component (see Appendix B.1).14 Therefore, estimation of the parameters
of interest requires knowledge of whether h − 1 years before those in the observed sample of
households were expansionary or contractionary. In turn, this implies that more time variation
in the aggregate state is exploited in the estimation. Thus, helping to increase the accuracy of
estimating moments separately for periods of expansion and contraction (see also Storesletten
13 In this literature, as well as here, the time series of the aggregate state is taken as given. It is an interesting
and non-trivial extension in this framework to model the aggregate state jointly with idiosyncratic shocks (see
Bloom et al. (2018) on the importance of firm-level uncertainty for aggregate fluctuations).
14 In Appendix E, we discuss an alternative representation of co-kurtosis and summarise the main results under
this specification to establish robustness.
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et al. (2004), who introduced this identification approach and the web appendix of Bayer and
Juessen (2012) for a Monte Carlo evaluation of this method).
3.2 Estimation
We next calculate the empirical central moments of the residuals from the Mincer regression.
To obtain the idiosyncratic component of household income, υi,h,t, we follow the literature on
earnings dynamics and run a Mincerian-type regression to partial out non-stochastic effects from
income. In particular, we assume that (3) is given by:
yi,h,t = bxi,h,t + υi,h,t, (10)
where b is a vector of parameters.15 The regressors, xi,h,t in (10) include calendar year time
effects, dummies for experience (captured by a full set of age dummies), region of residence
dummies, gender dummies, marital status dummies, household size and interaction between
marital status dummies and household size. For the region dummies, we use the UK Government
Offi ce Regions classification which corresponds with the highest tier of sub-national division
in England, Scotland and Wales. Furthermore, following Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we
allow for the returns to the observable deterministic characteristics to be skill-specific. Hence,
we estimate (10) for two separate skill groups, i.e. households whose head has a University
education and those households whose head does not. Finally, since in our econometric analysis
we employ household quantities for the arguments in (10), we define the age, gender, marital
status and regional effects in terms of the head of the household. We denote by υ̂i,h,t the
estimated idiosyncratic component of household income.
In every year t, we group households in the sample into 5-year adjacent age cells indexed by
h, i.e. we define a household as belonging to the age group h if the age of the head was between
h − 2 and h + 2. For example, the first cell, i.e. age group 25, contains households with age
between 23 and 27 years old, the second cell, i.e. age group 26, contains all households with
heads between 24 and 28 years old, while the last cell, i.e. age group 60, contains all households











where υ̂i,h,t and υ̂i,h+κ,t+κ denote the sample averages of υ̂i,h,t and υ̂i,h+κ,t+κ respectively, (φ, ψ) ∈
{(1, 1) , (2, 1) , (2, 2)}, κ = 0, ...,min [T − t,H − h], Ih,t,κ =
∑N
i=1 ιi,h,t,κ and ι is an indicator
function which is one when an individual i of age group h at time t is also present in time t+κ,




h=1 min{H − h+ 1, T − t+ 1} moments.
Our sample length and age grouping of T = 18 and H = 36 thus lead to a total of 15, 561
empirical moments that we calculate from the data. In contrast, our theoretical moments are
a function of the 19 parameters in the theoretical model, in which the moments higher than
the first vary across age and time following the parametric restrictions specified by the model.
15For the estimation we normalise t = 1, ..., T = 18.
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Conditional on specific sequences of contractions and expansions of the aggregate state f (t)
observed in the data, we estimate the parameters employing a minimum distance estimator that
chooses the parameter vector to minimise the distance between the empirical and the theoretical
moments. We discuss the details on estimation and the bootstrap procedure used to estimate
the confidence intervals for hypothesis testing in Appendix B.2. In Appendix B.3, we discuss
how variation in the aggregate state informs the estimation. Finally, as shown in Appendix
B.4, given suffi cient variation in the history of the aggregate state, the 19 parameters in the
theoretical model are identified if we observe four consecutive periods and four age groups in
the panel sample.
4 Time variation in labour income risk
We start with an analysis of the main result relating to the cyclicality of the persistent process
and then discuss extensions.
4.1 Higher-order cyclicality of persistent shocks
We summarise the estimated model parameters relating to the persistent component of labour
income shocks in Table 1. The estimates reveal that the third central moments of the distribution
of shocks to the persistent component of idiosyncratic labour income (i.e. of the distribution Fη
in Section 3) are negative in both expansions and contractions. These results indicate negatively
skewed distributions of persistent shocks, implying a higher probability of receiving large negative
instead of positive shocks. Moreover, the results in Table 1 show that the fourth central moment
in recessions is higher than that of a normal distribution.
Table 1: Persistent labour income process
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, and is rejected at the same significance levels based on a one-
tailed confidence interval. All the tests are implemented using a block bootstrap with 3,000 replications.
To further examine whether the central moments of Fη are higher in absolute value during
contractions, we report in Table 2 the difference in these moments between expansions and
contractions. Table 2 also shows results from a one-sided test of the null hypothesis that the
moments in expansions are higher than or equal to (in absolute value) the respective moments in
contractions. Table 2 reveals that, while the variance of the shocks is not significantly higher in
contractions relative to expansions, the third central moment is significantly more negative. The
fourth central moment is significantly higher at the 10% level when comparing offi cial recessions
to expansions.
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4 ≥ 0 are rejected at significance
level 1% (*** ), 5% (** ) or 10% (* ), based on a one-tailed confidence interval procedure,
implemented using a block bootstrap with 3,000 replications.
The cyclical pattern of the third and fourth central moments imply cyclical variation in
risk. First, conditional on the fourth central moment, the asymmetry in the distribution of
idiosyncratic labour income shocks, implied by the negative third central moment in contractions,
suggests that in downturns it is more likely to draw large negative relative to large positive labour
income shocks. A negative third central moment indicates that the left tail is thicker than the
right tail. Since the left tail represents negative shocks, a thicker left tail in contractions than
in expansions implies a higher probability of a household receiving a very large negative income
shock in bad times.16 Second, conditional on the third central moment, an increase in the fourth
central moment implies an increase in the probability of receiving extreme shocks. Therefore,
since the fourth central moment is not reduced in recessions, the probability of receiving extreme
shocks is at least as high in these periods. Together, the third and fourth central moments
imply an increase in labour income risk in downturns. Therefore, overall we have evidence of
countercyclical risk in Great Britain.
The cyclicality of higher-order household labour income risk for GB coheres with interna-
tional evidence in Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020) who decompose shocks to household labour
income. They also investigate the cyclicality of third and fourth central moments of shocks to
the persistent component separately from possible initial conditions and transitory shocks. De-
spite the differences in our modelling of the income process, discussed in Section 3, our findings
for GB are similar to those in Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020) for Germany and the US. In
addition to cyclical third and fourth moments, these studies also find that the variance of shocks
to persistent income increases during contractions. In contrast, our findings for GB highlight the
importance of the asymmetry of the distribution of shocks without significant cyclical changes in
the variance. The significance of the cyclicality of the asymmetry of the distribution of shocks
is also consistent with the findings of Guvenen et al. (2014) and Busch et al. (2021). They
emphasise the countercyclical property of the left-skewness of income risk when the latter is
approximated by earnings growth.17 The results here broadly cohere with those of Bayer and
16Guvenen et al. (2014) refer to this change in the distribution as countercyclical left-skewness. This is consistent
with the results here, i.e. in a contraction, the third central moment is smaller (i.e. more negative) than in an
expansion.
17Guvenen et al. (2014) and Busch et al. (2021) approximate income risk by income growth, without a
statistical decomposition of shocks to those affecting the persistent and the transitory component of income.
However, Guvenen et al. (2014) also examine the moments of the distribution of 5-year earnings growth to
approximate more persistent shocks.
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Juessen (2012), who also find an acyclical variance of wage risk for the UK.18 These findings
are also generally consistent with evidence for GB reported in Blundell and Etheridge (2010)
who decompose household earnings shocks into permanent and transitory components. The es-
timated variances of both earnings shock components over 1991-2003 in Blundell and Etheridge
(2010) do not show evident co-movement with the aggregate conditions.
The results in Table 2 demonstrate cyclical risk in terms of shocks to the persistent com-
ponent of labour income. In contrast, the results regarding the distribution of shocks to the
transitory component of labour income show that, despite differences in the distributions be-
tween expansions and contractions, the change is not readily associated with an increase in
transitory risk in contractions (see Appendix Table C.1).
The parameter estimates relating to the stochastic effects, captured by the initial conditions,
are reported in Appendix Table C.2. The results confirm the downward trend in variance
suggested by the first row of Figure 1. However, once the time-variation in household income
risk driven by aggregate conditions is accounted for, the time pattern of the third and fourth
central moments of the distribution of pre-labour market shocks is not statistically significant.
4.1.1 Economic intuition
To illustrate the income risk implications of the differences in the third and fourth central
moments of Fη between recessions and expansions, we next calculate probabilities of labour
income shocks associated with the tails of the distribution under two different assumptions.19
First, we assume that Fη is an asymmetric distribution, which we calibrate to the second to
fourth moments estimated from the data. Second, we assume that this distribution is instead
given by a symmetric normal distribution. In this case, only the variance changes between
recessions and expansions.
To operationalise this approach, we compute a distribution Fη following the approach in Gu-
venen et al. (2014) by assuming that this distribution is a mixture of two Gaussian distributions
in expansions, and a different mixture in recessions. In particular, we assume that:
ηi,t ∼ F̂η =
{
η1i,t ∼ N(µ1,f(t),, σ21) with probability pf(t)
η2i,t ∼ N(µ2,f(t),, σ22) with probability 1− pf(t)
where 0 < σ21, σ
2
2 < ∞ and 0 ≤ pf(t) ≤ 1. We calibrate the parameters {pe, pc, µ1e, µ2e, µ1c,
µ2c, σ21, σ
2
2}, using a minimum distance routine, so that the calibrated distribution, F̂η, has the
same central moments as Fη when the aggregate state is measured by the offi cial classification
in recessions. Using F̂η we calculate the probability that a household receives big adverse and
big positive shocks by integrating F̂η below and above certain thresholds for expansions and
recessions separately.
18Using PSID data for the US, Storesletten et al. (2004) find a countercyclical variance of shocks to the persistent
component of household labour income. Ziliak et al. (2011), employing data from the Current Population Survey,
without decomposing shocks to transitory and persistent components, found that the volatility of individual male
and female earnings growth are countercyclical and procyclical, respectively.
19More generally, the importance of the higher-order moments of income risk in explaining properties of earnings
and wealth inequality in the data, and in evaluating the welfare implications of risk, has been analysed in the
literature (see McKay (2017), De Nardi et al. (2020) and Angelopoulos et al. (2020)).
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Table 3: Probabilities of big shocks
[1] [2] [3] [4]






probability of recession expansions recessions expansions
income gain>40%: Pr(ηi,t> ln (1.40)) 0.00% 0.00% 10.28% 9.52%
income gain>20%: Pr(ηi,t> ln (1.20)) 0.00% 2.90% 24.65% 23.91%
income loss>50% : Pr(ηi,t< ln (0.50)) 3.15% 1.11% 0.45% 0.35%
income loss>75%: Pr(ηi,t< ln (0.75)) 2.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
The probabilities of gains/losses are with respect to the level of persistent income under the mean shock.
Note that ηi,t refers to the natural logarithm of persistent shocks to labour income, and has zero mean.
In Table 3, we report the probability that a household receives an idiosyncratic shock to
the persistent component of their labour income that reduces (increases) their persistent income
by a specific percentage, compared to what it would have been, had it received the mean ηi,t
shock (which is zero). To contextualise the shocks considered in Table 3, an example of a loss
of 50% of annual labour income would be a situation where a member of a household with two
working members becomes unemployed for the whole year, or both members face prolonged
unemployment. In contrast, a loss of more than 75% implies further significant earnings losses
for the other member as well. Further situations might include severe drops in earnings, e.g. for
self-employed members, or when shocks imply a change in a job associated with a big drop in
wage when only one member works. The significant common element from these examples is that
losses of 50% or 75% of household labour income reflect catastrophic events at the household
level. In other words, they do not simply refer to an unemployment spell or a wage cut.
The results using F̂η are in columns [1] and [2]. We can see that, during recessions, the
left tail of the distribution becomes "thicker". In other words, the probability that a household
receives a big adverse shock increases. At the same time, the right tail of the distribution be-
comes "thinner". That is, the probability a household receives a big beneficial shock decreases.
Quantitatively, the effects regarding the left tail are important. In particular, the probability
that a household loses more than half of its annual labour income more than doubles in reces-
sions. Note that this probability is of a comparable magnitude to the proportion of long term
unemployed in the UK labour force. For example, between 1983-2008 this rate was, on average,
2.8% (see OECD (2020).20 Moreover, in more than 60% of the cases where households lose more
than half of their income, households lose more than three-quarters of their labour income. This
circumstance is in stark contrast with expansions, where even households who lose more than
half of their labour income, do not lose more than three-quarters of it. In the context of the
employment example, this implies that even if one member becomes unemployed for the whole
year during expansions, the household can rely on the other member’s employment to alleviate
part of the shock. Therefore, catastrophic events, which have low probability and a huge impact,
effectively do not happen in expansions. However, they do become possible in recessions.
20Long term unemployed include those who have been unemployed for at least one year.
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To contextualise the effects resulting from the asymmetric distribution F̂η, we calculate the
probabilities in Table 3 under a counterfactual experiment obtained by assuming that ηi,t’s are
normally distributed with the same variance as for F̂η. We compute the distribution for the






. Two results stand
out in this case. First, quantitatively, the increase in the probability of very bad shocks is
very small, and catastrophic events remain zero probability events even in recessions. Second,
qualitatively, the results speak of an increase in uncertainty during recessions, but not necessarily
in downside risk, since the probability of big positive shocks also increases.
4.2 Frequency of recessions
Recessions are not evenly distributed over the period 1956 to 2008. In particular, there are
more frequent recessions until 1991, and no offi cial recessions recorded after 1991, until the 2008
recession. We exploit this variation in the data to design an alternative test of the implications of
cyclicality in labour income risk. The idea is that if recessions imply higher risk than expansions,
then periods with a higher frequency of recessions should be associated with higher risk relative
to periods with a lower frequency of recessions. More specifically, if shocks to the persistent
component of residual labour income in recessions have higher third and fourth moments, but
not second moments, relative to expansions, then periods with a higher frequency of recessions
should be associated with higher income risk with the same form. In particular, with higher
third and fourth moments, but not second moments, relative to periods with lower frequency of
recessions.
To operationalise this experiment, we modify the model in (4)-(8), by testing whether labour
income risk is higher in earlier periods relative to later periods. In particular, we let the respective
moments higher than the first of the distribution in (8) take values depending on whether the
aggregate state, f(t), refers to the time period A = [1956,Λ] or B = [Λ + 1, 2008], where we set
Λ = 1991, 1997. This implies that for τ = 2, 3, 4:
mη,f(t)τ ≡ mη,eτ If(t)=A +mη,cτ If(t)=B. (12)
Our motivation for choosing Λ = 1991 is that this year defines the start date for the longest
time horizon since 1956 without offi cial recessions, i.e. the period 1991 to 2008 (which is for-
tunately within the BHPS sample). The beginning of the 1990s is also associated with a slow
down in inequality (see Belfield et al. (2017)). The year Λ = 1997 further divides the sample
into two periods with high and low frequency of recessions and is associated with a subsequent
reduction in inequality which is also linked with a more robust macroeconomic performance (see
Belfield et al. (2017)).
Estimation of the new model specification for income dynamics follows the same procedure
as in the base model. In Table 4, we show the difference between the estimated moments
for the two periods A and B, i.e. for Λ = 1991, 1997.21 The results confirm that there was
an indeed higher risk in the earlier period of the sample, which has a higher proportion of
21Note that the differences between periods reported in Table 4 are similar if Λ is set to different years in the
1990s.
13
recessions. In particular, Table 4 clearly shows that the higher risk in period A is associated
with higher (in absolute value) moments mη,f(t)3 and m
η,f(t)
4 , whereas differences in m
η,f(t)
2 are
not significant, therefore being consistent with the explanation that the higher risk in period A
is driven by the higher frequency of recessions since recessions imply exactly these characteristics
of higher labour income risk. Our findings support the role of macroeconomic volatility as a
contributor to increased household labour income risk before 1991; and vice versa, the role of
greater macroeconomic stability as a contributor to the decline in household labour income risk
post-1991.
Table 4: Differences between periods with different frequency of recessions
Λ = 1991 Λ = 1997
Period A: 28% recessions Period A: 24% recessions
























4 ≤0, and are rejected
at significance level 1% (*** ), 5% (** ) or 10% (* ), based on a one-tail confidence interval
procedure, implemented using a block bootstrap with 3,000 replications.
Our results also contribute to the understanding of the evolution of income inequality in the
UK. Previous research has established that the increase in household net income inequality in the
UK, which had risen rapidly in the late 70s, slowed down after 1990 (see Blundell and Etheridge
(2010) and Belfield et al. (2017)). Whereas household earnings inequality, and residual earnings
inequality, increased until 1997, but at a slower rate relative to previous decades (see Blundell
and Etheridge (2010)). Therefore, the period between 1990 and the late 90s is a period of
decompression in household earnings inequality, which was moderated even further after 1997.
The moderation of inequality since the late 90s has been linked to improved macroeconomic
performance (Belfield et al. (2017)). Our results are consistent with these analyses of inequality,
emphasising the role of macroeconomic stability in affecting household income risk and thus
income differences between households.22 In particular, our findings suggest that the more robust
macroeconomic performance was working since the beginning of the 90s to reduce household
income risk, and thus positively impacted changes in income inequality.
5 Which policy mitigates persistent shocks?
We next estimate the model parameters using the different definitions of labour income post
taxes and/or benefits, using the offi cial recessions as the measure of the aggregate state and
examine whether there is a decrease in risk post-policy.23 In particular, we examine whether
there is a significant reduction in the moments of the distribution of shocks to the persistent
22For an analysis of income inequality in recent decades in the UK, see Jenkins (1995), Blundell and Etheridge
(2010), Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016), Belfield et al. (2017) and Blundell et al. (2018).
23The parameter estimates are reported in Appendix D.
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component of income, Fη, as a result of tax/benefit policy, by comparing moments estimated
using labour income to those estimated using income post-policy intervention. To this end,
Table 5 summarises the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the relevant moments are
higher (in absolute value) post policy.
Table 5: Policy effects on persistent component
τ = 2 τ = 3 τ = 4
j = e j = c j = e j = c j = e j = c
[mη,jτ ]Y−[mη,jτ ]Y−T 0.0088 0.0127 -0.0067 -0.0265 0.0063 0.0509
[mη,jτ ]Y−[mη,jτ ]Y+bn 0.0168 0.0364∗∗ -0.0233 -0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0125 0.1508∗∗
[mη,jτ ]Y−[mη,jτ ]Y+bn−T 0.0246 0.0431∗∗∗ -0.0239 -0.1001∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.1539∗∗
The superscripts Y, bn, T(=t+ni) refer to labour income, benefits, and taxes and national insurance










Γ ∈({Y − T }, {Y + bn}, {Y + bn− T }) and j ∈({c}, {e}), and are rejected at significance level 1%
(*** ), 5% (** ) or 10% (* ), based on a one-tail confidence interval procedure, implemented using a block
bootstrap with 3,000 replications.
The differences between labour income and the various measures of income net of policy
reported in Table 5 indicate, qualitatively, that tax and benefit policy together work in the
right direction and reduce the variance and higher central moments of the distribution of shocks
to the persistent component of idiosyncratic income. The effect of the policy is significant
during contractions. Evaluating taxes and benefits separately, we find that, consistently, it is
the benefits policy that significantly reduces risk.
Our findings regarding the beneficial impact of a social insurance policy are generally con-
sistent with existing evidence for GB in Blundell and Etheridge (2010), for Sweden in Domeij
and Floden (2010), for Germany in Busch and Ludwig (2016), for the US in Kniesner and Ziliak
(2002) and in Dynarski and Gruber (1997), and for the US, Germany and Sweden in Busch
et al. (2021), among others. Importantly, we find that for all the moments considered, the
effects of benefits in reducing risk exposure are bigger than taxes and national insurance. This
result coheres with evidence for the UK suggesting that benefits have stronger effects in reducing
household income inequality than taxes (see figure 7a in Belfield et al. (2017) and Figures 4.5
and 4.6 in Blundell and Etheridge (2010)). In contrast, Kniesner and Ziliak (2002) find that, in
the US, the effects of taxes and transfers are quantitatively similar when studying the reduction
in the variance of household earnings growth.24
5.1 Effect of policy on the cyclicality of risk
In Table 6 we compare the cyclical behaviour of income risk (based on the third and fourth
central moments) pre-and post-policy to assess the effectiveness of social insurance to mitigate
24A comparison between GB and the US, regarding the effects of the tax and welfare system in reducing
inequality, is in Blundell et al. (2018). They highlight the importance of the generosity of transfer payments in
GB post-1997 in this respect.
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this risk.25 To this end, we summarise the results of tests of the hypothesis that the increase
(in absolute value) in relevant moments during recessions is significantly higher post policy. In
other words, we examine whether the cyclicality of risk been reduced by the social insurance
policy.
Table 6: Policy effects on the cyclicality of persistent risk
τ = 3 τ = 4
[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]Y−[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]Y−T 0.0198 -0.0446
[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]Y−[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]T+bn 0.0692∗∗ -0.1383∗
[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]Y−[mη,eτ −mη,cτ ]T+bn−T 0.0761∗∗ -0.1407∗
The superscripts Y, bn, T(=t+ni) refer to labour income, benefits and taxes and national insurance















for Γ ∈({Y − T }, {Y + bn}, {Y + bn− T }) are rejected at significance level 1% (*** ), 5% (** ) or
10% (* ), based on a one-tailed confidence interval procedure, implemented using a block bootstrap
with 3,000 replications.
The results show that taxes and national insurance contributions do not significantly reduce
the cyclicality of the third and fourth central moments. In contrast, these were significantly
reduced when benefits were taken into account. Busch and Ludwig (2016, 2020), using data for
Germany and the US, find that economic policy in the form of taxation and benefits policies
reduces the increase in risk exposure arising from shocks to permanent income in contractions.
However, they do not examine the effect of the tax and benefit policies separately.
6 Conclusions
Using data from the BHPS (1991-2008) and a parametric econometric approach, which allowed
us to exploit the history dependence of cross-sectional moments, this paper provided new ev-
idence on the cyclical behaviour of household labour income risk in GB. We also assessed the
role of social insurance policy in mitigating this source of income risk. To this end, we decom-
posed stochastic idiosyncratic household income into its transitory and persistent components,
accounting for cohort heterogeneity over time. We focused our analysis on the cyclicality of the
second to fourth moments of the probability distribution of shocks to the persistent component
of income.
We discovered that in GB, household labour income risk increases during contractions, pri-
marily via an increase in the absolute value of the third central moment of persistent shocks,
while the variance remains acyclical. Taken together, the changes in the moments considered
imply that households face an increased probability of receiving large negative shocks during
contractions.
Households respond to increases in labour income risk via ex-ante precautionary and ex-
post corrective economic activities, which lead to inequality and can affect market quantities.
25Note that since the cyclical income risk measures, based on the second moments, were generally not signifi-
cantly different from zero in Table D.1, we do not test for post-policy effects in this case.
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For example, precautionary behaviour related to higher labour income risk may lead to ex-ante
increases in savings and labour supply as well as portfolio adjustments to include more lower-
risk lower-return assets (see e.g. Kniesner and Ziliak (2002), Low et al. (2010), and Meghir
and Pistaferri (2011)). In contrast, ex-post responses to negative shocks to labour income might
include the liquidation of assets and durable goods, changing jobs as well as family labour supply.
Therefore, our results provide additional support to research that incorporates cyclicality in risk
to understand economic outcomes.26
Risk exposure matters for household welfare and motivates government intervention to pro-
vide insurance. Cyclicality of risk, hence, suggests that increased intervention is justified during
recessions. Our findings regarding the effects of economic policy imply that it has reduced both
the level of risk exposure and its increase during contractions when risk exposure is measured by
the magnitude of the third and fourth central moments of the distribution of persistent labour
income shocks. In particular, we find that this reduction is achieved via the benefits as opposed
to tax policies. This result confirms the importance of benefits as a policy instrument in miti-
gating income volatility, in addition to inequality, which has been previously noted by other UK
studies using different methods than those employed here (see Blundell and Etheridge (2010)
and Belfield et al. (2017)).
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